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LEARNING FROM OUR MISTAKES:
THE BELFAST PROJECT LITIGATION AND
THE NEED FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO
RECOGNIZE AN ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN
THE UNITED STATES
Kathryn L. Steffen*
INTRODUCTION
“History must not be a weapon against those trying to
seize the opportunity of today to build a more
promising tomorrow.”1
Senator John F. Kerry
In the United States, we hail the freedom of expression and
the right to education as cornerstones of our democracy. Under our
belief system, academia is the oasis in an ever-changing world where
people from various backgrounds flock to freely exchange
information. Not only is this exchange of information intrinsically
valuable, but it also has extrinsic worth. History is compiled through
the shared experiences of others and becomes a guide to creating a
better future when new generations heed the lessons of the past.
However, the Supreme Court recently denied a controversial petition
for writ of certiorari, which presented the Court with an opportunity
to solidify and protect these ideals by recognizing a constitutional
privilege for academic researchers.
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University, 2014
1 John Kerry, Op-Ed, Irish Future Shouldn’t Get Lost in Violent Past,
BOSTON HERALD, April 4, 2012,
http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/category/congressionalaction/senator-kerry-op-ed-unedited/ [hereinafter Kerry Op-Ed].
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In 2001, researchers sponsored by Boston College began to
compile an oral history of “The Troubles,” a decades-long period of
violent political conflict in Northern Ireland.2 Through this oral
history, titled the Belfast Project, the researchers hoped to gain
insight into the thought processes of individuals who become
personally engaged in violent conflict by interviewing people who
took up arms during “The Troubles.”3 The interviewees’ participation
was conditioned on a strict promise of confidentiality.4
Based on its suspicion that the interviews contained evidence
of criminal activity,5 the United Kingdom requested that the United
States subpoena the controversial materials on its behalf, pursuant to
a mutual legal assistance treaty.6 Boston College and the individual
researchers involved in the Belfast Project challenged the subpoena,
asserting an academic privilege that would allow them to protect
confidential information from compelled disclosure.7 The First
Circuit denied the existence of this privilege,8 and the lead Belfast
Project researchers petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari in November 2012.9 The Supreme Court denied the

2 In re Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2012); United States
v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435, 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2012).
3 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831
F.Supp.2d at 440.
4 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (explaining that interviewees
were required to contract with Boston College to protect their anonymity).
5 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 452.
6 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12. Generally, mutual legal
assistance treaties allow for the state parties to exchange evidence and information
about criminal matters. BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFFAIRS, 2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm.
7 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453.
8 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Moloney v. United States, No. 12627 (petition for cert. denied April 15, 2013).
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petition in April 2013,10 and the case returned to the First Circuit,
which limited the amount of interview materials to be surrendered.11
Anthony McIntyre,12 one of the lead researchers, also
petitioned the High Court in Belfast to protect the interviews from
compelled disclosure.13 The sitting judge dismissed the case upon his
belief that McIntyre’s life would not be jeopardized by satisfaction of
the subpoena, and McIntyre expressed his intention to appeal.14
This comment argues that compelling academics to disclose
confidential information significantly obstructs the free flow of
information that is essential to a thriving democratic society. Through
the lens of the Belfast Project controversy, this comment examines
the state of an academic privilege in American jurisprudence and then
advocates that the U.S. adopt the reasoning of the European Court
of Human Rights when the right to freedom of expression is
implicated. A license to disregard confidentiality agreements would
imperil all individuals involved in high-intensity research and would
threaten to tarnish the integrity of academic endeavors.
At first blush, the United States appears to be the ideal forum
to champion researchers’ rights. However, considering the applicable
law and the context of the Belfast Project, had certiorari been
granted, the Supreme Court likely would have found against the
researchers and declined to recognize an academic privilege. Instead,
this issue should be more favorably litigated in the United Kingdom,
where the European Convention on Human Rights applies. Finally, if
10 Boston College Project: PSNI Get Dolours Price Interviews Access, BBC, Apr.
15, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-22158392.
11 The Belfast Project, Boston College, and a Sealed Subpoena, BOSTON COLLEGE
SUBPOENA NEWS, http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/ (last visited
January 8, 2013)(“The ruling reduced the amount of material to be handed over
from 85 interviews (roughly half of the archive) to segments of 11 interviews.”).
12 McIntyre’s role in the Belfast Project and the subsequent litigation is
explained in depth infra Part I.A.2.
13 McIntyre
Loses IRA Tapes Case, UTV (Oct. 2, 2012),
http://www.u.tv/News/McIntyre-loses-IRA-tapes-case/7a7ec609-006e-4608870e-a44a393e7104.
14 Id. This decision was based on Article 2 of the European Convention
of Human Rights, not on Article 10, the focus of this comment. At the time of
writing, there has been no update given about the anticipated appeal.
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the researchers are unsuccessful in both American and European
courts, the comment suggests that the U.S. Secretary of State should
decline to enforce the British authorities’ request because it
contravenes public policy.
I. THE BELFAST PROJECT
A. Purpose and Design of the Belfast Project
1. The purpose of the Belfast Project
In 2001, Boston College initiated its sponsorship of the
Belfast Project,15 an oral history project dedicated to gathering and
preserving the recollections of members of the paramilitary
organizations actively engaged in both the Republican and Loyalist
sides of the conflict during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland from
1969 forward.16
“The Troubles” refers to the violent conflict between the
Republican Nationalists and the Loyalist Unionists that plagued
Northern Ireland from 1969 until 1998,17 when the parties finally
reached the Good Friday Agreement.18 The seeds of “The Troubles”
were planted in 1920, when Great Britain granted home rule to
Northern Ireland, releasing it from its former dependence on
London.19 Protestant Unionists who wanted Northern Ireland to
remain unified with Great Britain comprised the majority of the
Northern Irish population.20 Contrarily, the Nationalist, mainly
Catholic, minority wanted to unite Northern Ireland and the
Republic of Ireland to create an all Irish state.21 “Republican” and
Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Boston College has a
continued academic interest in Irish Studies. The College was also involved in the
peace process in Northern Ireland, following “The Troubles.”
16 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (1st Cir. 2012); Trs. of Boston
Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d 435 at 440 (D. Mass. 2011), aff’d, 685 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
17 Lorenzo Bosi, Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional
Irish Republican Army, 1969-1972, 36 SOC. SCI. HIST. 347, 356 (2012).
18 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27.
19 Bosi, supra note 17, at 355.
20 Id. at 378.
21 Id. at 355, 378.
15
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“Loyalist” are the terms given to those sympathizers who were
prepared to use political violence to further their respective causes.22
Tensions erupted in 1969 when interactions between
Nationalist civil rights activists, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC),
and the Loyalist countermovement became violent.23 The violence
spread rapidly to Belfast, where Nationalists were a distinct
minority.24 There, the RUC and Loyalist mobs attacked the
Nationalist communities, hoping to quell an anticipated Nationalist
rebellion.25 Considering the worsening upheaval in Northern Ireland,
the British Government ended its longstanding policy of noninvolvement and deployed British troops to restore order in
Northern Ireland.26 The Republicans and Loyalists took up arms to
protect their interests, characterizing the tense and violent political
climate of Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement in
1998.27
In addition to creating a historical account of “The
Troubles,” the Boston College researchers also aspired to gain insight
into the personality and mindset of an individual who engages in
violent conflict.28 According to the project’s creators, the Belfast
Project is a vital step toward understanding not only the conflict in
Northern Ireland, but also the dynamics of conflicts worldwide.29

Id. at 378.
Bosi, supra note 17, at 355. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was
the state police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 until the initiation of the
Good Friday Agreement reforms, and it was closely associated with the British
government during “the Troubles.” Per the Good Friday Agreement, the RUC was
renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland in 2001. Royal Ulster Constabulary, in
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511633/Royal-UlsterConstabulary-RUC (last updated June 11, 2013).
24 Bosi, supra note 17, at 356.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. passim.
28 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440.
29 Id.
22
23
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2. The Belfast Project’s design evinces the importance of confidentiality
Because of the continuing sensitivity and danger
characterizing the conflict in Northern Ireland,30 the Belfast Project’s
structure was essential to its success.31 Ed Moloney, the journalist and
writer who initially proposed the project, entered into an agreement
with Boston College to become the project’s director.32 Moloney’s
contract required him to ensure that the interviewers and
interviewees signed and adhered to a strict confidentiality
agreement.33 The agreement prohibited all participants from
disclosing the existence and scope of the project without the
permission of Boston College.34 Furthermore, the contract mandated
that interviewers use a coding system when documenting their
research to protect the anonymity of interviewees.35 Only Ed
Moloney and Robert K. O’Neill, the librarian of the Burns Library
where the project was stored, had access to the coding system’s key.36
Therefore, they were the only persons able to identify the
interviewees.37

30 See id. at 441 (indicating that, because of the continued tensions in
Northern Ireland, the Belfast Project leaders determined that the interviews could
not safely be housed in Ireland). See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9,
at 9 (discussing a report from the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, stating
that there are significant risks to the lives of people who are publicly revealed to be,
or suspected of being, paramilitary informants).
31 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (“In general, Boston
College believes that interviewees conditioned their participation on the promises
of strict confidentiality and anonymity”).
32 Id. at 440.
33 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4.
34 Id. at 4-5.
35 Id. at 5.
36 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440-41. Boston College’s Burns
Library of Rare Books and Special Collections houses many valuable documents.
Id. at 440. In July 2013, it was reported that Boston College might have lost the
coded keys to the Belfast Project interviews, rendering the interviewees
unidentifiable. Ed Moloney denies responsibility for the mistake. Jim Dee, Boston
Tapes Gaffe: Confessions May Be Useless After Identity Codes Lost, BELFAST TELEGRAPH,
July 29, 2013, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northernireland/boston-tapes-name-gaffe-confessions-may-be-useless-after-identity-codeslost-29455178.html.
37 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
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In addition to Moloney and O’Neill, the Belfast Project
employed two researchers to interview members of paramilitary
groups associated with both sides of the conflict.38 Antony McIntyre,
the Lead Project Researcher39 who himself was a former member of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA),40 entered into a contract with
Moloney, which was governed by the same terms as Moloney’s
contract with Boston College.41 Under the contract’s terms, McIntyre
was likewise legally bound to protect the privacy of the project and
the identities of its subjects.42 By the project’s end in 2006, McIntyre
had conducted twenty-six interviews of individuals associated with
the Republican side of the conflict in Northern Ireland.43
Interviewees also contracted with Boston College to protect
their anonymity and the contents of their interviews.44 Specifically,
interviewees signed donation agreements, which transferred
possession and absolute title to their interview recordings and
transcripts to Boston College upon their deaths.45 The following
clause contained in the donation agreements restricts access to the
interview materials:
Access to the tapes and transcripts shall be restricted
until after my death except in those cases where I
have provided prior written approval for their use
following consultation with the Burns Librarian,
Boston College. Due to the sensitivity of the content,
the ultimate power of release shall rest with me. After
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 2.
40 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5.
41 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
42 See id. (explaining that Moloney’s contract prohibited him from
disclosing the existence or scope of the Belfast Project to anyone without the
permission of Boston College. Additionally, Moloney was required to use a strict
coding system to preserve the interviewees’ anonymity).
43 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5 (noting that the Belfast Project
ended in 2006. In total, the Belfast Project is comprised of a forty-one interview
series, each of which may contain multiple interviews with the same individual).
44 See id.
45 Id. (explaining that the donation agreement included a provision that
also transferred the rights to whatever copyright an interviewee may own in the
contents of the interview).
38
39
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my death, the Burns Librarian of Boston College may
exercise such power exclusively.46
Per the agreement, only the signing participant has the
authority to release information pertaining to his or her interview.47
Neither the interviewer nor Boston College was permitted to disclose
the identities of the participants or the contents of their interviews
until the interviewees either gave permission or died.48 Therefore, the
Belfast Project researchers assumed a duty of confidentiality to
protect the identities of the participants and the contents of the
interviews.
B. Litigation Surrounding the Belfast Project
In 2011, two sets of subpoenas requesting information related
to the Belfast Project were issued to Boston College49 on behalf of
the Police Service of Northern Ireland50 pursuant to the Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom (US-UK MLAT).51 The US-UK MLAT, which was signed
in 1994, is a bilateral treaty intended to improve law enforcement
cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom.52 A
request for a subpoena under the US-UK MLAT is a direct request
by the Executive Branch on behalf of a foreign power—in this case,
on behalf of the United Kingdom.53

46 Id. (noting that this quoted portion of the agreement was executed by
Brendan Hughes, a deceased interviewee). Although the other interviewees’
agreements were not part of the record, the First Circuit reasonably extrapolated
that each interviewee signed the same agreement.
47 Id. at 5-6.
48 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 5- 6.
49 See id. at 3.
50 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1.
51 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3, 12 (noting that the statutory
authority to be applied as the procedural mechanism for executing subpoenas
under the US-UK MLAT is codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3512). Section 3512 was
enacted as part of the Foreign Evidence Request Efficacy Act of 2009. This is the
first court of appeals decision to interpret a mutual legal assistance treaty and §
3512 together.
52 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 442.
53 Id. at 452.
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According to the United Kingdom, the requested information
from the Belfast Project is connected to the abduction and murder of
Jean McConville, which occurred in 1972.54 McConville was believed
to be an informant to the British, making her a prime target for the
Republicans in Northern Ireland during “The Troubles.”55
The first set of subpoenas, issued in May 2011, requested the
recorded interviews and documents associated with interviewees
Brendan Hughes and Dolours Price,56 two former IRA members.57
The May 2011 subpoenas did not mention McConville specifically.58
Rather, the request stated that the materials were needed to assist the
United Kingdom’s investigation of alleged crimes.59 Boston College
supplied the information associated with Brendan Hughes because
his confidentiality was not at issue, as he died prior to the request. 60
However, the College moved to quash or modify the subpoena for
information related to Dolours Price, who was still living at the
time.61
Later, in August 2011, Boston College was served with
another set of subpoenas requested by the United Kingdom pursuant
to the US-UK MLAT, this time demanding the recordings,
transcripts, and records of all interviews containing information
about the death and abduction of Jean McConville.62 Boston College
promptly moved to quash the August 2011 set of subpoenas as well.63

Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
Id.
56 Id. at 3; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440.
57 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 11.
58 See Request From the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
59 Id. (listing the crimes under investigation as murder, conspiracy to
murder, incitement to murder, aggravated burglary, false imprisonment,
kidnapping, and causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm).
60 Id. at 3.
61 Id.; Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 440. Dolours Price passed
away in January 2013. Paul Vitello, Dolours Price, Defiant I.R.A. Bomber, Dies at 61,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
25,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/europe/dolours-price-defiant-irabomber-dies-at-61.html.
62 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
63 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3.
54
55
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In support of its motions to quash, Boston College asserted
an academic privilege, arguing that the First Circuit has recognized
protections for confidential academic research material64 and that
those protections apply to the information at issue.65 Under the case
law of the First Circuit, a subpoena to obtain information from a
confidential source in a criminal case implicates First Amendment
concerns and, therefore, calls for a balancing of considerations before
it is executed.66 The general rule is that confidential information
cannot be compelled from a reporter or an academician unless it is
directly relevant to a serious claim made in good faith, and the same
information is not available from a less sensitive source.67 If these
threshold conditions are met, a court must then balance the
government’s need for the evidence against the risk of potential harm
to the free flow of information between informants and academicians
if confidentiality is broken.
The District Court of Massachusetts denied the existence of
an academic privilege, but proceeded to apply the case law of the
First Circuit to determine if the subpoenas should be executed.68 The
district court found that, although the targeted materials were indeed
confidential, they were relevant to a serious claim, requested in good
faith, and were not available from a less sensitive source.69 Next, the
district court conducted the balancing test and found that the
considerations weighed strongly in favor of disclosing the
confidential information to the government.70
Ed Moloney and Anthony McIntyre moved to intervene,
claiming an interest not only in defending their pledge of
confidentiality, but also in guarding their personal safety and the
63. Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 453.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 457.
69 Id. at 456.
70 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4 (noting Boston College appealed
the order regarding the August subpoenas, but it did not appeal the order regarding
the May subpoena requesting the interviews of Dolours Price. Presently, the
Boston College portion of the litigation is over, and only Moloney and McIntyre’s
claims continue); Tr. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 457.
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safety of their sources.71 The district court denied the motion to
intervene on the ground that Moloney and McIntyre did not have a
private right of action under the US-UK MLAT.72 Furthermore, the
district court concluded that Boston College adequately represented
any interests that Moloney or McIntyre may have relating to their
involvement in the Belfast Project.73
After the district court denied their motion to intervene,
Moloney and McIntyre filed an original complaint, which the district
court dismissed for the same reasons it denied their motion to
intervene.74 Moloney and McIntyre appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, challenging the district court’s denial of their
motion to intervene75 and the dismissal of their original complaint.76
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as it
pertained to a private right of action.77 The Court held that Moloney
and McIntyre could not assert a legally cognizable claim under the
US-UK MLAT because the treaty specifically disclaims the existence
of a private right of action upon which relief can be granted.78
Furthermore, the First Circuit dismissed Moloney and McIntyre’s
claim of academic privilege under the First Amendment, holding that
the Supreme Court decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), was controlling.79

Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 458.
Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 7, 8 (explaining that Article 1 of
the US-UK MLAT specifically states that the Treaty is intended solely for mutual
legal assistance between the United States and the United Kingdom, and that the
Treaty does not give rise to a right of private action on the part of an individual to
obtain, suppress, or exclude any evidence, or to impede the execution of a request).
73 Id. at 7.
74 Id. (assuming arguendo that Moloney and McIntyre had standing, the
District Court dismissed their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
for failure to state a claim).
75 Id.
76 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 4.
77 Id. at 20.
78 Id. at 13.
79 Id. at 16 (noting that, in Branzburg, the Supreme Court rejected the
existence of a reporters’ privilege. Branzburg is developed in sufficient detail in Part
II).
71
72
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In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that a reporter does not
have the privilege to withhold information from criminal justice
authorities in the face of a grand jury subpoena, even if the reporter
has promised confidentiality to his source.80 Although Moloney and
McIntyre were not claiming a press privilege, the First Circuit has
established that academic researchers are entitled to the same
protections that the law provides for journalists.81 Moreover, the First
Circuit found that the rationale behind Branzburg, although it involved
a reporter being subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, applied to
Moloney and McIntyre’s action under the US-UK MLAT.82
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the government’s
interest in law enforcement outweighed the risk that compelling the
press to disclose confidential sources would freeze the free flow of
communication.83 Similarly, the First Circuit explained that the USUK MLAT serves the strong law enforcement interests of the United
States and the United Kingdom, and the court agreed with the district
court’s holding that compelling the information from the Belfast
Project would not severely inhibit the success of the Belfast Project
or future academic endeavors.84

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 (1972). See also Request from
the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
81 Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir.
1998)(“Academicians engaged in pre-publication research should be accorded
protection commensurate to that which the law provides for journalists[]”).
82 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 16.
83 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690.
84 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19. Branzburg and its progeny took the
risk of the potential chilling effect into account and came to the same
determination. In its application of the balancing test, the district court gave weight
to the fact that the Belfast Project concluded in 2006, arguing that the subpoena
would not inhibit the Belfast Project researchers to gain information.
80
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II. ACADEMIC PRIVILEGE IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Supreme Court Denied the Existence of a Journalists’
Privilege
1. The background of Branzburg v. Hayes
To fully understand the progression of the Belfast Project
litigation, one must first understand the important precedent set by
the Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes. In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide four separate appeals, each of
which raised the proposition that the confidentiality of a reporter’s
sources is privileged under the First Amendment.85 Specifically, the
reporters asserting the privilege in Branzburg argued that their First
Amendment rights were abridged when they were required to testify
to confidential information before grand juries.86
Two of the four appeals heard in Branzburg concerned
publications by Petitioner-Branzburg, a staff reporter for a daily
newspaper published in Louisville, Kentucky.87 On two occasions,
Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify before grand juries in
Kentucky, and he moved to quash the subpoenas each time on the
grounds that, if required to testify, he would be forced to disclose
information revealed to him in confidence.88
In Branzburg’s first controversial story, he recounted his
observations of two individuals synthesizing marijuana into hashish. 89
Shortly after the story’s publication, Branzburg was subpoenaed to
testify as to the identities of the drug users before the grand jury. 90
Although he appeared before a county grand jury, Branzburg refused
to name the individuals he saw in possession of the drugs. 91
Branzburg claimed that his refusal to answer was authorized by the
85
86
87
88
89

See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
Id. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668-70.
Id. at 667; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 345-36 (Ky. Ct. App.

1970).
90
91

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 346.
Id.
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First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in addition to
other laws.92 The trial court disagreed and required Branzburg to
answer.93 Thereafter, Branzburg sought prohibition and mandamus
from the Kentucky Court of Appeals on the same grounds, but the
court denied his petitions.94
Branzburg’s second appeal was sparked by a later story
describing the use of drugs in another Kentucky town.95 While
researching the story, Branzburg spent two weeks interviewing drug
users.96 Once more, Branzburg was summoned to appear before a
county grand jury to testify about the statutory violations concerning
the sale and use of drugs, to which he was made privy.97 Branzburg’s
motion to quash the subpoena was denied.98 Branzburg then
petitioned the court of appeals for writs of prohibition and
mandamus, as he had in his earlier case concerning the use of drugs.99
Again, Branzburg’s petitions were denied.100
The next judgment under review in Branzburg was In re
Pappas.101 Petitioner-Pappas was a television newsman and a
photographer for a Massachusetts television station.102 Pappas was
called to New Bedford, Massachusetts, to report on civil disorders in
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668; Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d at 347.
The other laws under which Branzburg sought relief were the Kentucky reporters’
privilege statute (Ky.Rev.Stat. § 421.100) (1962)) and several sections of the
Kentucky Constitution.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 668-69 (explaining that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
interpreted Kentucky’s reporters’ privilege statute to afford a reporter the privilege
of refusing to disclose the identity of an informant, but held that the statute did not
authorize a reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally,
including the identities of those persons he had observed).
95 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d 748, 749
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
96 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669.
97 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669; Branzburg v. Meigs, 530 S.W.2d at 749.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 670.
100 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 671.
101 Id. at 672.
102 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (Mass.
1971).
92
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the area, which were related to activity of the Black Panther Party. 103
Pappas gained access to the Black Panther headquarters in the area,
where he recorded and photographed a prepared statement read by
one of the group’s leaders.104 The Black Panther leaders admitted
Pappas to their meeting place on the strict condition that he
promised not to disclose anything he heard or saw inside of the
headquarters.105
Two months later, Pappas was called before a county grand
jury as part of an investigation into the criminal acts during the
period of civil disorder on which he had reported in New Bedford. 106
Although he appeared and willingly answered questions regarding his
name, address, employment, and observations outside of the Black
Panther headquarters, Pappas refused to testify about his
observations during his stay inside the headquarters.107 Like
Branzburg, Pappas claimed that he, as a reporter, had a First
Amendment privilege to protect confidential information he received
in the course of investigative work.108 After Pappas refused to answer,
he was served with a second summons to appear before the grand
jury and to provide all evidence connected to the matters about
which he was questioned.109 Pappas claimed a First Amendment
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672, 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298, 299.
While reviewing Pappas’ case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took
judicial notice that, in July 1970, New Bedford, Massachusetts, was rife with civil
disorder, which included “street barricades, exclusion of the public from certain
streets, and similar turmoil.”
104 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298. The
Black Panther headquarters was located in a boarded-up store. The streets
surrounding the store were barricaded, but Pappas was eventually able to enter the
area.
105 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d. at 298 (noting
that, per his agreement with the Black Panthers, Pappas was at liberty to
photograph and report the anticipated police raid).
106 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672-73, 674. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts did not have a record of the hearing below, but the court assumed
that the grand jury investigation at issue was an effort to identify and indict those
responsible for the criminal acts that occurred during the period of civil disorder in
New Bedford.
107 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 298.
108 Id.
109 Id.
103
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privilege and moved to quash the subpoena, but the trial court denied
his motion.110
Reviewing Pappas’ appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts specifically rejected the holding of the Ninth Circuit in
Caldwell v. United States, described below, and held that reporters do
not have a constitutional privilege authorizing them to refuse to
appear and testify before a court or a grand jury.111 Additionally, the
court reaffirmed its prior holdings that testimonial privileges must be
limited.112 According to Massachusetts’s precedent, the principle that
the public has a right to every man’s evidence has traditionally
outweighed competing interests.113 Furthermore, the court went on to
conclude that any adverse effect on the free flow of news by
requiring reporters to testify would be indirect, theoretical, and
uncertain.114
Finally, the last decision under the Supreme Court’s review in
Branzburg was the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Caldwell.115
Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, had written stories
covering the Black Panthers and other black militant groups in
California.116 In a fact pattern similar to that surrounding the Belfast
Project litigation, Caldwell was subpoenaed to testify before a federal
grand jury regarding various potential criminal violations committed
by the militants.117 The first summons served on Caldwell ordered
him to bring all notes and tape recordings from his interviews with
the officers and spokespeople of the Black Panther Party regarding

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 673 (noting that, in contrast to Kentucky,
Massachusetts did not have a statutory reporters’ privilege at the time of Pappas’s
motion.)
111 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03.
112 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674.
113 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674; In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 299-300.
114 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d at 302)
115 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675.
116 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675; Caldwell v. U.S., 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th
Cir. 1970).
117 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675-76, 677. Possible violations included
threats against President Nixon, assassination, conspiracy to assassinate, and
interstate travel to incite a riot.
110
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the organization’s aims, purposes, and activities.118 After Caldwell
objected to the scope of the subpoena, the government modified its
request, calling only for the reporter to appear before the grand
jury.119
Caldwell and The New York Times moved to quash the
subpoena, arguing that, if required to testify, Caldwell’s working
relationship with the Black Panther Party would be destroyed,
effectively suppressing essential First Amendment freedoms by
chilling the flow of communication between the press and the
militants.120 The District Court denied the motion to quash121 but
instituted a protective measure allowing the journalist to refuse to
disclose confidential information in the absence of a showing by the
government of a compelling and overriding interest in disclosure.122 A
second subpoena was issued, and Caldwell filed another motion to
quash, which was subsequently denied.123
In the face of the order, Caldwell refused to testify before the
grand jury and was held in contempt of court.124 Caldwell appealed
the contempt order, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
requiring a journalist to testify before a grand jury would dissuade
informants from communicating with him in the future.125
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit recognized the potential chill to the
free flow of information as a threat great enough to require the
government to show necessity before compelling a reporter to appear
before a grand jury.126

Id. at 675.
Id. at 675-76.
120 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 676; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1084.
121 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 677.
122 Id. at 678; Caldwell, 434 F.3d at 1083.
123
. Id. (noting that, during the time the district court was reviewing
Caldwell’s first motion to quash, the grand jury’s term expired, and a new grand
jury was convened. After the second grand jury was assembled, the second
subpoena was issued to Caldwell. Caldwell’s new motion to quash was submitted
on the prior record).
124 Id.
125 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1084.
126 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 697; Caldwell, 434 F.2d at 1085-86.
118
119
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding that requiring a reporter to testify
would substantially deter future communications between the media
and informants marked a stark split from the perspectives of the
appellate courts in Branzburg I, Branzburg II, and Pappas, which found
that any negative effect of requiring a journalist to disclose
confidential information on the free flow of communication was
tenuous and indirect.127 The Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari to address the disputed journalists’ privilege claimed by
Branzburg, Pappas, and Caldwell.128
2. Summary of the argument for a privilege before the U.S. Supreme
Court in Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court considered the newsmen’s
contention that a reporter should not be required to appear or testify
before a grand jury or at a trial unless the government sufficiently
shows that: (1) the reporter is privy to evidence relevant to the crime
under investigation; (2) the evidence is not available from another
source; and (3) the government’s need for the evidence is sufficiently
compelling to outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake. 129
Journalists Petitioner-Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and RespondentCaldwell each refused to respond to grand jury subpoenas and testify
about evidence relevant to criminal investigations.130 Generally,
citizens are not exempt from answering a grand jury subpoena;131
however, a constitutional provision may authorize a citizen to refuse
to appear and testify.132
The Branzburg journalists submitted that the First
Amendment freedom of the press authorized their refusal to appear
and testify before a grand jury because, if they were forced to
respond and divulge confidential sources, future informants would
withhold important, newsworthy information.133 Essentially, if
journalists could be required to divulge their confidential sources,
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

See id. at 671, 674, 679.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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then sources would not come forward with information.134 Without
the participation of informants, newsworthy information would be
unavailable for dissemination to the public, placing a burden on the
free flow of communication in violation of the First Amendment.135
3. Why the Branzburg majority refused to recognize a journalists’
privilege under the First Amendment
To arrive at its conclusion that journalists do not have a
constitutional privilege to keep confidences in the face of a grand jury
subpoena, the Court first reviewed other, well-accepted limitations on
the freedom of the press.136 For example, journalists do not have the
right to violate the liberties of others,137 nor may journalists publish
any story they wish with impunity.138 Although the journalist’s task is
to disseminate news to the public, the journalist is not granted special
access, constitutional or otherwise, to judicial conferences, grand jury
proceedings, or crime scenes.139
Despite these limitations, the Majority was compelled to
acknowledge the importance of the freedom of the press in the
United States and in American jurisprudence.140 The Court
recognized that newsgathering is indeed protected by the First
Amendment.141 In fact, the court asserted that the freedom of the
press would be eviscerated without the protection of the First
Amendment.142 However, the Majority determined that PetitionerSee id.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682.
136 See id. at 683-86.
137 Id. at 683. In Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937), the
Supreme Court held that the Associated Press was bound by the standards of the
National Labor Relations Act.
138 Id. at 683-84 (elaborating that, for example, the press may be subject
to liability for circulating knowing or reckless falsehoods. In such cases, journalists
may be held responsible for compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover,
journalists may also be criminally prosecuted for publications of this nature).
139 Id. at 684-85. Notably, the press may also be prohibited from
publishing information about trials if such publications threaten to prejudice a
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial.
140 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
141 Id.
142 Id.
134
135
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Branzburg, Petitioner-Pappas, and Respondent-Caldwell’s claims did
not implicate the First Amendment because (1) the journalists were
not subject to any restraint on the contents of their publications, (2)
they were not forced to publish stories they wished to conceal, and
(3) they were not penalized for the contents of their publications.143
The fact that the journalists were not prohibited from using
confidential sources in their task of newsgathering was also crucial to
the Court’s decision.144 Although the journalists’ access to
confidential informants was not explicitly restricted, the Court did
not find that requiring journalists to appear before grand juries would
pose a significant threat to the newsmen’s access to information from
confidential sources.145
Rather than recognizing the utility of receiving important
information from confidential sources and crediting legitimate
reasons for an informant’s desire for discretion, the Majority’s
perception was that informants seek confidentiality chiefly to avoid
criminal prosecution.146 The Majority failed to see the utility in
transmitting controversial news to the public and failed to give
adequate import to a journalist’s integrity in his attempts to keep a
confidence.147
In situations where the confidential informant is not a
criminal offender but has knowledge of illegal activity, the Court
posited that the informant may want to protect his reputation, keep
his job, or avoid becoming involved in criminal litigation.148 In its list
Id.
Id. at 681-82.
145 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693 (“[T]he evidence fails to
demonstrate that there would be a significant construction of the flow of news to
the public. . . .”).
146 See id. at 691 (“The preference for anonymity of those confidential
informants involved in actual criminal conduct is presumably a product of their
desire to escape criminal prosecution, and this preference, while understandable, is
hardly deserving of constitutional protection”).
147 See id. at 692 (“Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the
First Amendment protects a newsman’s agreement to conceal the criminal conduct
of his source, or evidence thereof, on the theory that it is better to write about
crime than to do something about it[]”).
148 Id. at 693.
143
144
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of considerations, the Majority also casually noted that the informant
may fear for his personal safety, but failed to acknowledge the reality
of this concern and how it could affect the free flow of information
between informants and the media, and, in turn, between the media
and the public.149
Reaching its holding, the Majority was unwavering in
concluding that the public interest in prosecuting a crime outweighs
any interest the public may have in receiving information obtained
from a confidential informant.150
III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
A. The European Convention on Human Rights
Unlike the Branzburg Majority, the Council of Europe has
recognized that the interest in protecting confidentiality may
outweigh other concerns, including the prevention of crime.151 The
Council of Europe’s main purpose is to achieve unity152 between its
forty-seven member nations.153 In furtherance of its progressive
goals, the Council of Europe developed the European Convention
on Human Rights to promote and protect the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of the citizens of its member nations.154 The
Convention is a binding international agreement,155 and all member

Id.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
151 See generally Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413.
152 European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Article 10].
153 Impact in 47 Countries, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://human-rightsconvention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-on-human-rights/ (last visited
Jan. 9, 2014).
154 Article 10, supra note 152.
155 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, A GUIDE TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS ACT 1998 5 (Dep’t for Constitutional Affairs ed., 3d ed. 2006),
http://www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-rights/human-rights/pdf/act-studyguide.pdf.
149
150
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nations, including the United Kingdom, have ratified or acceded to
it.156
The Convention both enshrines the fundamental rights that
are guaranteed to all citizens and is legally binding, similar to the Bill
of Rights of the United States Constitution.157 When an individual
feels that his rights under the Convention have been violated or
restricted, he can lodge an application with the European Court of
Human Rights.158
1.

A journalistic privilege exists under Article 10 of the Convention
on Human Rights

Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights protects the
individual’s right to express himself. Specifically, Article 10 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such
156 Council
of Europe Human Rights Convention Website,
http://human-rights-convention.org/impact-of-the-european-convention-onhuman-rights/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
157 U.S. CONST. amends. I-X; accord European Convention on Human
Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. For more on the European
Convention on Human Rights and its role in European courts, see Frank Murray,
Boston College’s Defense of the Belfast Project: a Renewed Call for a Researcher’s Privilege to
Protect Academia, 2 INT’L J. ACAD. RES. BUS. AND SOC. SCI. 1, 18-19 (2012).
158 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 155, at 5. The
European Court of Human Rights is located in Strasbourg, France. Before lodging
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant must first
exhaust all available state remedies. The applicant has six months from the date of
the final domestic court decision to petition the European Court of Human Rights.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 6 (undated),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Questions_Answers_ENG.pdf.
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formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights
of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.159
Relevantly, the European Court of Human Rights has
interpreted Article 10 to protect journalists from being compelled to
disclose the identities of their sources.160 Furthermore, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has specifically
declared that Article 10 protects a journalist’s right to maintain the
confidentiality of his sources.161
2. Analyzing a cause of action under Article 10.
Like the Branzburg Court,162 the European Court of Human
Rights noted in Goodwin v. United Kingdom that compelling journalists
to disclose the identities of their confidential sources could have a
chilling effect on the free flow of communication between the media
and the public.163 However, the European Court of Human Rights
found the threat to be more palpable, explaining that the important
public watchdog function served by the press would be undermined

Article 10, supra note 152.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57974.
161 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 4TH EUROPEAN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE
ON
MASS MEDIA POLICY 35 (Council of Europe ed., 1994),
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlo
bGet&InstranetImage=411463&SecMode=1&DocId=517420&Usage=2.
The
Committee of Ministers enumerated this Principle at the 4th European ministerial
Conference of Mass Media Policy in 1994.
162 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82, 693.
163 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
159
160
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if journalists were unable to obtain accurate and reliable information
from sources who wish to remain unnamed.164
When evaluating a cause of action under Article 10, the
European Court of Human Rights will first look to the facts of a
particular case to determine if a public authority has interfered with
the applicant’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed under
paragraph 1 of Article 10.165 For example, in Voskuil v. The
Netherlands, the Court found that the Court of Appeal, a public
authority, interfered when it ordered the detention of the applicant in
an attempt to compel him to name his source for a news story.166
If the Court finds that a public authority has interfered with
the applicant’s right of expression, then the Court will proceed to
analyze the facts of the case under paragraph 2 of Article 10 to
determine if the interference was justified.167 Analysis under the
second paragraph of Article 10 requires an assessment of three
prongs.168 First, the Court will determine if law prescribed the
interference.169 In other words, the Court inquires whether the
government’s action had a lawful basis in domestic law.170
Second, if the Court determines that the government’s mode
of interference had an adequate basis in the relevant domestic law,
the Court will consider whether the interference pursued a legitimate
aim.171 According to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe, the legitimate aims that justify interference with the
journalistic freedom of expression are set forth in the exhaustive list

Id. at 693. The Branzburg court did not find that requiring disclosure
would significantly obstruct the free flow of communication.
165 See id. at 496.
166 Voskuil
v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-83413.
167 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
496.
168 See Article 10, supra note 152.
169 See Article 10, supra note 152; see also Goodwin v. United Kingdom
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 496.
170 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14.
171 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
498; See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
164
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contained in paragraph 2 of Article 10.172 A public authority need
only pursue one of the enumerated aims to satisfy this prong of the
test.173 Furthermore, the interference must have been foreseeable by
the applicant in light of the stipulated restrictions.174
Finally, the Court must determine whether the interference is
necessary in a democratic society.175 If the interference is necessary, it
must also be proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim
pursued by the restriction.176 If the limiting authority cannot establish
proportionality and relevance to an extent sufficient to override the
vital public interest in a free press, then interference is not necessary
in a democratic society, and the applicant’s rights under Article 10
will be deemed violated.177
According to case law from the European Court of Human
Rights, necessity is a difficult standard for the government to prove
when it restricts journalistic confidentiality.178 The Council of Europe
acknowledges that freedom of expression is a cornerstone of
democracy and declares that protecting the freedom of the press is an
important and fundamental requirement in this regard.179
In Goodwin, the European Court of Human Rights expressed
that the protection of journalistic sources is so essential to a free
press that an order compelling a journalist to disclose his source’s
identity must be justified by an overriding requirement in the public
interest.180 Restrictions on journalistic confidentiality require the
Court’s strictest scrutiny, and the scales weigh heavily in favor of

172
173

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,

498.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
498-500; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
176 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
177 See id. at 502-03.
178 See id. at 500-01.
179 Id. at 500.
180 Id.
174
175
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maintaining a free press.181 The test of necessity is fact-intensive, and
the court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
if the government’s reason for interfering with the freedom of the
press is both relevant and sufficient.182
3. What if the interference was intended to prevent crime?
The Convention considers the prevention of crime to be a
potential justification for restricting journalistic confidentiality.183
Although specified in Article 10, the goal of preventing crime or
disorder will not always justify a restriction on expression.184 For
instance, in Voskuil v. The Netherlands, a police officer informed a
journalist that the police staged a flood to gain access into an
apartment belonging to a group of individuals who were subsequently
prosecuted for arms trafficking after the officers’ entry revealed
weapons.185
The journalist was called as a trial witness for the defendants,
but he refused to disclose the identity of the police officer who had
tipped him off.186 When he refused, he was held in contempt and
sentenced to a detention for a maximum of 30 days.187 The journalist
then filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights,
alleging a violation of his rights under Article 10.188
Evaluating the journalist’s Article 10 claim, the Court
accepted the Government’s contention that it interfered to further
the prevention of crime, a legitimate aim under paragraph 2 of Article
10.189 The confidential information that the journalist held, the Court
explained, implicated the integrity of the Netherlands police force

181

Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500-

182

Id.
Article 10, supra note 152.
See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15-16.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 14.
Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.

01.
183
184
185
186
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and contained facts that could secure the defendants a fair trial.190
Regardless, the Court held that the Government’s interest in the
informant’s identity could not overcome the journalist’s interest in
protecting his source’s confidentiality.191
The Branzburg Court differed fundamentally in its analysis of
journalistic privilege in the context of criminal activity. While the
European Court of Human Rights placed great significance on the
journalist’s integrity and livelihood, as well as the public’s right to
information,192 the Supreme Court was preoccupied with the source’s
motives behind his wish to remain confidential.193 The European
Court of Human Rights is willing to conduct the balancing of
interests under Article 10, even in the context of high stakes criminal
cases,194 but the Supreme Court in Branzburg tersely concluded that
the public’s interest in the prosecution of crime almost always
outweighs its interest in information.195
IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM PRESENTS THE BEST AVAILABLE
FORUM TO SEEK PROTECTION OF THE BELFAST PROJECT MATERIALS
A. The Council of Europe Takes a More Practical Approach
Toward Protecting Freedom of Expression than the United
States
Although Article 10 of the Convention on Human Rights
specifically protects journalistic freedom of expression,196 academic
privilege may properly be analogized to a journalistic privilege. Like
journalists, academic researchers are devoted to collecting and
analyzing information, then disseminating their findings to an
audience with the hope that the audience will be enriched as a
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
192 See id.
193 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691.
194 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 passim.
195 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
196 See Article 10, supra note 152; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7),
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483 passim; Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
passim.
190
191
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result.197 The value of academic research, like the news, hinges on the
availability, reliability, and accuracy of sources.198 The U.S. Supreme
Court and the European Court of Human Rights agree that a free
press is a cornerstone of democracy.199 However, the two authorities
diverge in their perspectives on how to protect the press’s freedom of
expression.200
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court articulated that public
authorities must not place restrictions on the content of publications,
force journalists to publish stories against their will, or prohibit the
use of confidential sources.201 From the Supreme Court’s perspective,
requiring a journalist to disclose the identity of a confidential source
does not constitute a prohibition on the use of confidential
sources.202 Furthermore, the Branzburg Court and the First Circuit203
determined that compelled disclosure of a confidential source would
have only a theoretical and uncertain chilling effect on the free
exchange of information between the press and the public.204
The European Court of Human Rights takes a more practical
approach. Rather than accept at face value the fact that journalists
were not forbidden from obtaining information from confidential
sources,205 the Court stressed that, under Article 10, a journalist’s
right to use and keep a confidence is vital to a thriving, free press. 206
See Murray, supra note 157, at 3-9, for an in depth discussion of the
functions researchers perform in society, both historically and contemporarily, and
why an academic privilege is essential to the successful performance of these
functions.
198 See Cusumano, 162 F.3d at 714.
199 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681; Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7),
1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
200 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82; but cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom
(No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 500.
201 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82.
202 See id.
203 See Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 19.
204 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 674 (quoting In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at
302). Although it is quoting the Massachusetts decision here, the Supreme Court
adopts the proposition in its own analysis and conclusion on appeal.
205 But cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82.
206 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
496,500.
197
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While the United States federal courts have characterized the chilling
effect as an uncertain harm,207 the European Court of Human Rights
more accurately observed that if journalists were compelled to
divulge confidences, then sources who wish to remain anonymous
would be discouraged from coming forward with information,
thereby undermining the ability of the press to present useful and
reliable news to the public.208 For the press to be truly free, they must
be protected from the threat of compelled disclosure of their
confidential sources.
B. Applying Article 10 Jurisprudence to the Belfast Project
Litigation
When assessing whether a public authority’s attempt to
compel a journalist to disclose a confidential source violates Article
10, the European Court of Human Rights begins with the
understanding that a journalist’s right to keep a confidence is so
essential to democracy that the disclosure must be justified by an
overriding public interest.209 The law is positioned in favor of
nondisclosure, and the public authority must satisfy the difficult
standard of necessity.210 Regarding McIntyre’s application in Belfast,
the High Court based its analysis—and subsequent denial—of the
petition on Article 2 of the Convention, not Article 10.211 This
comment argues that the writ should have been decided in his favor.
Considering that it was not, the following analysis predicts how the
Court of Appeal or European Court of Human Rights would review
McIntyre’s Article 10 claim.

See In re Pappas, 226 N.E.2d at 302. For a detailed discussion of cases
addressing a scholarly privilege in the United States federal courts, see also Murray,
supra note 157, at 9-18.
208 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
500.
209 See id.
210 See id. at 500-01.
211 In the Matter of Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave to Apply
for Judicial Review, [2012] NIQB 65 (N. Ir.), http://www.courtsni.gov.uk/enGB/Judicial
Decisions/PublishedByYear/Documents/2012/%5B2012%5D
NIQB 65/j_j_TRE8601FINAL-PUBLISH.htm.
207
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1. Applying the Article 10 test to the facts of the Belfast Project
Litigation
a. Did a public authority interfere with the Belfast Project researchers’
right to freedom of expression? - Yes, the government of the United
Kingdom interfered with the rights of Boston College, Moloney, and
McIntyre to keep the Belfast Project sources and interview materials
confidential when it requested the materials on behalf of the Police
Service of Northern Ireland.212
b. Was the interference prescribed by law? - Yes, the United
Kingdom, on behalf of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, was
acting within the bounds of domestic law when it interfered with the
researchers’ right to maintain confidentiality because it requested the
Belfast Project interview materials to pursue a criminal
investigation.213
c. Was the interference directed toward the pursuit of a legitimate aim? To meet this prong of the test, the Government must show (1) that it
subpoenaed the information in pursuit of the public interest214 and
(2) that the researchers could have foreseen the interference for that
particular purpose.215 Under Article 10, the prevention of crime or
disorder is a legitimate aim.216 In the case of the Belfast Project, the
United Kingdom requested the interviews on behalf of the Police
Service of Northern Ireland217 because the police suspected that the
materials contained information essential to the investigation of a
variety of crimes.218 Taken at face value, the prevention and
prosecution of criminal activity are clearly legitimate pursuits for the

212 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3; cf. Voskuil v. Netherlands,
2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 14.
213 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 3.
214 See Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15; Goodwin v.
United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 498.
215 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 161, at 35.
216 Article 10, supra note 152.
217 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 1.
218 Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
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good of the public. However, stating a legitimate motive does not
necessarily justify an interference with the right to free expression.219
Foreseeability on the parts of Moloney and McIntyre is more
challenging to establish. Considering the highly political nature of
“The Troubles” and the amnesty provision under the Good Friday
Agreement,220 the researchers could have reasonably concluded that
the Police Service of Northern Ireland would not attempt to
prosecute cold cases, such as the 1972 murder and abduction of
McConville.221 Furthermore, Moloney and McIntyre have described
the McConville situation as a “longstanding ‘non-investigation,’”
further supporting the proposition that they could not have foreseen
that the United Kingdom would request the interviews to inquire into
40-year-old crimes.222
d. Was the interference necessary in a democratic society? - An analysis
under Branzburg would have ended when the Government established
that its purpose for compelling disclosure was to prevent and
prosecute criminal activity.223 However, the European Court of
Human Rights takes the analysis a step further. In fact, the European
Court of Human Rights performs the very test that the petitioners
argued for in Branzburg: the government must show that its interest in
disclosure is compelling enough to outweigh the value of the
fundamental right to expression.224 In making this showing, the
Government must also establish that the level of interference is
proportionately calculated to achieve the legitimate aim pursued and
that the information is not reasonably available from an alternative
source.225

219

See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,

502-03.
220 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27. Under the terms
of the Good Friday Agreement, almost all prisoners, including many who had been
convicted of murder, were released by the British government.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 26.
223 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695.
224 See id. at 680; cf. Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur.
Ct. H.R. 483, 502-03.
225 Voskuil v. Netherlands, 2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 15.
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This approach is similar to that adopted in Branzburg;
however, the European Court of Human Rights places greater weight
on the journalist’s right to nondisclosure.226 Moreover, the totality of
the circumstances must be carefully considered, with weight placed in
favor of protecting the right to freedom of expression.227 Regarding
the Belfast Project litigation, the U.S. District Court for
Massachusetts determined that the requested information was not
available to be readily obtained from another, less sensitive source. 228
Considering the secrecy shrouding the paramilitary groups involved
in “The Troubles,”229 the courts of the United Kingdom would likely
reach the same conclusion.
The main point of contention, however, is on the
proportionality of the request.230 The United Kingdom sought
information to aid in the investigation of crimes; however, the crimes
in question occurred in 1972—almost 40 years prior to the request.231
Additionally, the Police Service of Northern Ireland elected not to
pursue this particular investigation for a long period of time.232
Moreover, pursuant to the terms of the Good Friday Agreement
between the United Kingdom and the IRA, many prisoners,
226 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483,
500-01.; but cf. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 695 ([W]e cannot accept the argument that
the public interest in possible future news about crime from undisclosed, unverified
sources must take precedence over the public interest in pursuing and prosecuting
those crimes reported to the press by informants and in thus deterring the
commission of such crimes in the future.”).
227 Goodwin v. United Kingdom (No. 7), 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 483, 50001.
228 Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 456.
229 See id. at 441. The code of silence is evident through the extreme
measures taken by the Belfast Project researchers to ensure that the participants’
identities would be concealed.
230 Anthony McIntyre himself claimed that the compelled disclosure
would disproportionately interfere with his right to life under Article 2 and his right
to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence under Article 10.
Statement Filed Pursuant to Order 53, Rule(3)(2)(a) of the Rules of the Court of
Judicature (NI) 1980 at ¶ 3(b)-(d), In re Application by Anthony McIntyre for Leave
to
Apply
for
Judicial
Review,
[2012]
NIQB
65
(N.
Ir.),
http://www.scribd.com/fullscreen/99166414?access_key=keyjadvo5q2krzoyln48yc&allow_share=true&escape=false&view_mode=scroll.
231 Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6.
232 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26.
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including those convicted of murder during “The Troubles,” have
been released.233
Contrary to the current, ongoing criminal activity at issue at
the time of the Branzburg litigation,234 the criminal activity at issue in
the Belfast Project litigation was long over, and the actors were given
amnesty in furtherance of the political peace process.235 The
participants came forward to share the ghosts of their past with the
hope of providing insight and preventing future harm.236 In fact, if
the United Kingdom truly wishes to prevent future harm, crime, and
disorder, then it should strive to protect the participants’ identities.237
The IRA, of which McIntyre, Hughes, Price, and many other
participants were members, enforces a strict code of silence.238 If the
interviewees are revealed to have breached this code, their own safety
and the safety of the researchers involved in the Belfast Project likely
will be threatened.239
Furthermore, the inevitable chill to the free flow of
information is startling. Although the aim of prosecuting and
preventing crime is venerable, the consequences are too great to
justify a violation of the researchers’ right to keep their sources
confidential. If the disclosure is compelled, the United Kingdom may
have clues about their 40-year-old investigation; however, in so
doing, they will have placed their own citizens in harm’s way,
compromised the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland,
inhibited the success of valuable research to prevent future conflict,
Id. at 26-27.
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. passim.
235 See Request from the U.K., 685 F.3d at 6; see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 9, at 26-27.
236 See Request from U.K., 683 F.3d at 4 (noting that this was the goal of
the Belfast Project: to understand the minds of those engaged in violent conflict,
with the hope of preventing it in the future).
237 See Trs. of Boston Coll.,831 F.Supp.2d at 441 (explaining that tensions
still exist in Northern Ireland).
238 See id. (noting that interviewees conditioned their participation on
strict promises of confidentiality in order to protect their safety); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 (explaining that IRA members are forbidden from
sharing anything about IRA membership or operations with anyone, at penalty of
punishment at the hands of the Army).
239 See Trs. of Boston Coll., 831 F.Supp.2d at 441.
233
234
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and tarnished the reputation of the Belfast Project researchers.240
Therefore, compelled disclosure of the Belfast Project participants’
identities is not necessary in a democratic society. Conclusively,
courts in the United Kingdom, which are bound by Article 10, should
find that the researchers’ Article 10 rights were violated.
V. FULFILLING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S REQUEST CONTRAVENES
PUBLIC POLICY
If the researchers cannot protect the confidentiality of the
interview materials through the European court system, Article 3 of
the US-UK MLAT, which lists limitations on assistance, presents
another solution.241 Under Article 3, the United States may refuse its
assistance if the Attorney General, the treaty’s designated Central
Authority for the U.S., determines that the request, if granted, would
impair essential American interests or contravene United States
public policy.242 In this case, the United Kingdom’s request would
compromise the peace process in Northern Ireland, put the lives of
many at risk, and jeopardize the success of future academic
endeavors.243 Considering that the United States played a key role in
the Northern Ireland peace process and has a vested interest in the
safety and progress of British and American citizens, fulfilling the
United Kingdom’s request would impair the essential interests of the
United States and contravene public policy.244
Because the Belfast Project implicates foreign relations, it falls
under the purview of Secretary of State John Kerry. Secretary Kerry
has evinced a special interest in the Belfast Project litigation, both as
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9 passim.
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the United States of America
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.-U.K., art. 3,
Jan.
6,
1994,
T.I.A.S
No.
96-1202,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf [hereinafter US-UK
MLAT].
242 Id. art. 3.1(a), art. 2.2.
243 See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1 (expressing concern about the
consequences of fulfilling the United Kingdom’s request under the US-UK
MLAT).
244 See id. (acknowledging that the Good Friday Agreement was signed
under the “enormous leadership” of President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair).
240
241
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a Senator of Massachusetts and as the Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.245 In January 2012, he urged former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to work with British authorities to
revoke their request for the Belfast Project materials.246 Senator Kerry
was concerned that the United Kingdom’s request would disturb the
fragile Northern Ireland peace process and offend the spirit of the
Good Friday Agreement because any crimes recounted in the
interviews would have occurred prior to the accords.247 In addition to
the inherent political dangers, Senator Kerry also acknowledged the
threats to the Belfast Project participants and academia in general: “It
is my great hope that the academic integrity of these documents is
maintained and that these transcripts remain confidential because for
some this has become a matter of life and death.”248
According to Senator Kerry, the US-UK MLAT is a “vital”
instrument; however, it was “never meant to be used as a method of
reaching far back into a difficult history and perhaps eroding a
delicate truce that could lead to more lives being lost.”249 Based on
his earlier statements, Secretary Kerry has acknowledged that
fulfillment of the United Kingdom’s request would contravene
important public policy concerns and impair the United States’s

See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, Mass. Senator
and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., to Hillary Clinton, Sec’y of
State
(Jan.
23,
2012),
http://htmlimg2.scribdassets.com/9nepmj1w8w1d29hd/images/1-c3ae96f326.jpg
[hereinafter Letter from John Kerry].
246 Letter from John Kerry, supra note 245. Secretary Kerry is not alone in
his efforts. Other members of Congress who have written to Secretary Clinton on
the matter include Congressman Ackerman, Congressman Crowley, Senator
Menendez, Congressman O’Flaherty, Senator Schumer, Senator Brown,
Congressman Pascrell, Congressman Rothman, Congressman Doyle, Senator
Lautenberg, Congressman Murphy, Senator Lugar, Congressman Critz, Senator
Casey, Congressman Sires, Senator Cardin, Congressman Neal, Congressman
Pallone, Senator Gillibrand, and Congressman Higgins. Congress, BOSTON COLLEGE
SUBPOENA NEWS, http://bostoncollegesubpoena.wordpress.com/congress/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2013).
247 See Letter from John Kerry, supra note 245; Kerry Op-Ed, supra note
1.
248 Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1.
249 Id.
245

358

2014

Steffen

3:1

interest in a peaceful Northern Ireland.250 To protect the integrity of
the Belfast Project and the lives of those involved, Secretary Kerry
should work toward an agreeable resolution with the United
Kingdom that does not involve compelled disclosure of the
participants’ identities.
Although declining to enforce the United Kingdom’s request
would not create a constitutional privilege for academic researchers, it
would be a major step toward recognition of such a right. The
executive branch would demonstrate that the protection of
confidentiality in academic research could outweigh the prosecution
of crimes. Additionally, the decision would further legitimize
endeavors like the Belfast Project as important tools in American
culture, moving the standard of protection of researchers closer to
that for journalists.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe to recognize an academic privilege in the
United States. In their petition for certiorari, Moloney and McIntyre
indicated that the circuit courts have inconsistently applied Branzburg,
disagreeing whether and to what extent the First Amendment
protects against compelled disclosure of confidential information. 251
When the Belfast Project litigation was before the First Circuit
initially, Circuit Judge Torruella explained that he concurred in the
judgment of the First Circuit only because he was compelled to do so
by the Supreme Court’s holding in Branzburg.252
Although the Belfast Project will not be the vehicle for the
Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Branzburg, the controversy
surrounding the project indicates that the trend, both nationally and
internationally, is in favor of affording more, not less, protection to
journalists, academics, and other professionals who promise

250

See Kerry Op-Ed, supra note 1; Letter from John Kerry, supra note

251

See id. at 13.
Request of U.K., 685 F.3d at 20 (Torruella, C.J., concurring).
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confidentiality in exchange for information on important matters of
public interest.253
After examining academic privilege through the lens of the
Belfast Project, it is evident that compelling academicians to divulge
their confidential sources will inevitably and significantly obstruct the
free flow of information between researchers and their participants,
thereby depriving the public of valuable information. The protection
of academic confidentiality agreements is essential in two important
ways. Firstly, when individuals are encouraged to share their life
experiences in a safe, academic environment, researchers are able to
transmit the wisdom they glean to the public. Enlightening society
affords future generations the ability to learn from the mistakes of
the past and craft a better future. Simply put, if researchers cannot
promise anonymity to those informants who require it, then
informants will be hesitant to participate in studies, and researchers
will never be able to gather true and accurate information to
disseminate to the public.
Secondly, the safety of researchers and their sources hinges
on their ability to enter into and enforce confidentiality agreements.
As this comment has explained in its discussion of the Belfast
Project, research participants put themselves at risk when they share
their experiences regarding high-stakes, controversial, and dangerous
topics. Furthermore, academicians who conduct such projects also
expose themselves to peril. For endeavors like the Belfast Project,
confidentiality is virtually mandatory, not optional, for many research
participants. When considering claims such as those of Moloney and
McIntyre, courts should conduct the appropriate balancing test with
the understanding that an academic’s right to maintain confidentiality
is essential to a thriving, free society. If courts fail to do so, policy
makers must use the tools at their disposal to protect this vital
interest.

253

See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 14.
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